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During the first half of 2014, the slowing trend in activity in Latin America observable since 
2011 became more marked. The average year-on-year growth rate in the six main 
economies1 eased to 0.7% in Q2, from 2.3% in Q1, signifying growth 2 pp down on that 
recorded on average over the course of 2012 and 2013. 
Admittedly, the global economy performed worse than expected in the first half of the 
year and the commodity price boom continued to show signs of having run its course; 
but the unfavourable performance of the external environment does not appear to 
suffice to explain the intensity of the slowdown experienced by the Latin American 
economy, which was much more marked than that in other emerging regions (including 
eastern Europe, which may have been more affected by the sluggishness of the euro 
area and the crisis in Ukraine). Weak economic growth in Q1 in the United States – 
which had a temporary impact on economies with close trade links, such as Mexico – 
was partly offset in Q2; moreover, the fears in early 2014 of a sharp slowdown in the 
Chinese economy tended to evaporate following the stimulus measures adopted there. 
Lastly, and as the main external factor of support, international financial conditions 
opened the way for a new period of stability, which was of benefit to risk assets, 
including those in the emerging markets and, in particular, in Latin America. Hence, 
from Q2 to early September exchange rates stabilised, with the odd exception, stock 
markets surged (running counter to the cyclical phase) and sovereign spreads narrowed 
considerably in most Latin American countries, with worsening geopolitical risks failing 
to have a lasting impact on the markets. However, these positive trends have reversed 
in recent weeks. 
At the end of the first half of the year, among the biggest economies in the region, the 
cyclical position of Brazil and Argentina (and possibly Venezuela) was recessionary, while 
Chile and Peru had undergone a most significant slowdown. Colombia and Mexico were 
alone in posting more buoyant activity, which is reflected in the stability of their growth 
forecasts for 2015, amid a generalised downward revision (see Chart 1). Overall, Latin 
America might record its lowest growth rate since the crisis in 2014. 
Inflation has continued to show some stickiness, more so in the economies with more 
heterodox macroeconomic management arrangements, in which upward-trending, 
double-digit year-on-year growth rates have been recorded. In several countries with 
inflation targeting regimes, namely Brazil, along with Mexico and Chile, the year-on-year 
rates of the CPI have risen. Against this background, although there has been some 
divergence between the monetary policies of the various countries, the broad trend has 
been towards easing. Mexico, Chile and Peru used the leeway provided by their economic 
fundamentals and the credibility gained by their policies to cut their interest rates. Brazil 
called an end to the monetary tightening cycle last April, following a cumulative increase 
of 375 basis points (bp) in one year, and it has held its official interest rate at 11% since, 
but has recently relaxed its reserve requirement ratio so as to increase liquidity. Colombia 
is the only country to have raised its official interest rate (by 125 bp), against a background 
of strong domestic demand. 
Introduction
1  The Latin American aggregate includes six countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. 
Venezuela has been excluded as it has not published National Accounts figures since end-2013. 
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Some of the vulnerabilities present in several Latin American countries, which in May 2013 
– when debate arose over the start of the withdrawal of monetary stimuli by the US Federal 
Reserve – prompted a strong rise in volatility on the region’s financial markets, have started 
to be corrected, but this process is still only at an early stage. Thus, the current account 
deficit in the six main economies as a whole still stands at 2.9% of GDP, despite the easing 
in domestic demand and the adjustment in exchange rates, although it has ceased to 
widen. On the fiscal front, stimuli have been introduced in several countries to a greater or 
lesser extent, despite the fact that the budget deficit has widened to 3% of GDP in the 
region as a whole. 
Following the weakness shown by Latin American activity in the first half of 2014, it is 
possible in the coming quarters that growth rates may run at a pace more aligned with 
potential (this could be the case in Mexico), which in any event is estimated as lower than 
prior to the crisis for most countries. However, there are substantial risk factors. Chief 
among these is that arising from a potential tightening of global financial conditions (whose 
impact would be offset in part by more dynamic global growth), although there are also 
domestic risks. These include the prolonged weakness of investment, which appears to 
evidence a regional component associated, among other factors, with the end of the 
commodities cycle and which might exert a more lasting effect on growth, and the major 
imbalances in certain countries (Argentina and Venezuela, in particular), which may well 
accentuate economic divergences in the coming months. Against this backdrop, it is 
essential that economic policies should retain a stance compatible with the progressive 
correction of the vulnerabilities still present in the region. 
The world economy advanced less than expected in the first half of 2014. The negative 
surprises in growth figures were discernible both in the advanced and in the emerging 
economies. Of note among the former was the contraction in the US economy in Q1 as a 
result of temporary factors, namely particularly harsh weather and a marked decline in 
inventories, although it rebounded appreciably in Q2 and is expected to resume a growth 
rate of around 3% in the second half of the year. Moreover, in Q2, activity slowed 
significantly in the euro area, while in Japan the impact of tax rises on consumption was 
somewhat greater than anticipated. Inflation in the advanced economies has held at low 
levels, with the exception of Japan, where it stood above 3% as a result of the 
aforementioned tax rise.
External environment
SOURCE: Latin American Consensus Forecasts.
a Projections published between December 2013 and September 2014.
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On the whole the emerging economies also slowed to some degree in the first half of 2014. 
In China, in particular, there were signs of a loss of momentum in Q1, although the support 
brought to bear by economic policy reversed this trend in Q2. As well as in Latin America, 
the reduction in growth was particularly sharp in Russia and its neighbouring countries 
owing to the geopolitical conflict in Ukraine. Inflation in these economies has been relatively 
stable in recent months, with some divergences from region to region. 
Once the temporary factors contributing to the disappointing growth in the first half of the 
year have been overcome, the world economy may be expected to move towards a path 
of recovery which, however, will foreseeably be fragile and increasingly uneven from region 
to region. In any event, the balance of risks has veered progressively to the downside in 
recent months. Notable among the chief risks is that of a deterioration in the various 
geopolitical “hotspots”, the reversal of the boom on financial markets, the prolongation of 
excessively low inflation in certain advanced economies and, over a longer horizon, the 
trend towards lower growth potential in both advanced and emerging economies.
In contrast to the slowdown in activity in the first half of 2014 and the progressive downward 
revision of growth forecasts, the behaviour of the financial markets was predominantly 
positive from April to September. This was reflected in the search for yield by investors, 
against a backdrop of extensive global liquidity. As a result, the dichotomy observed in 
previous years remained in place, with a real economy not managing to map out a firm 
path of recovery and financial markets continuing to perform favourably. Nonetheless, in 
light of the growing divergences in monetary policy stance across the main advanced 
economies, there was a generalised appreciation of the dollar, in parallel with an increase 
in its volatility. Furthermore, a correction on the markets has been seen in recent weeks, 
impacting particularly sharply those segments where higher levels of overpricing seemed 
to be building up. 
Along these same lines, the financial indicators of the emerging economies were generally 
positive until late August. There was thus a pick-up on stock markets and a downtrend in 
sovereign yields, in a setting of low global volatility; rises to all-time highs on the main 
international stock exchanges; and a downward trend in long-term interest rates in the 
United States and other developed economies (see Chart 2). The decline in long-term 
interest rates partly reflected a compression of term premia, and also the decline in the 
interest rate expected at the end of the US upward cycle, in addition to further easing 
through the ECB’s non-conventional policies. The perception of lower risks in China and 
the progressive abatement of geopolitical tension in Ukraine also contributed to 
maintaining the aforementioned positive trend. In parallel, there was a marked recovery in 
retail investors’ capital inflows into these economies, especially onto the stock market, 
and the pace of bond issues on international markets was brisk. By mid-September, 
these issues outstripped the cumulative issues in the same period in 2013, which had set 
a historical high.
This trend was interrupted by certain short-lived bouts of intense global turmoil, arising 
mainly from escalating tensions in Ukraine and Syria. Subsequently, there has been a 
heavy fall on stock markets and a rise in sovereign yields since September, the result of 
emerging expectations that interest rate rises may possibly be brought forward in the 
United States and the re-emergence of certain doubts over the economic situation in 
China. This change has been reflected in an upward adjustment in US long-term interest 
rates and a generalised appreciation of the dollar, which lessened the profitability of carry 
trade with the more liquid emerging markets. 
Financial markets
and external financing
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On the Latin American markets, the regional stock market index, proxied by the MSCI and 
measured in dollars, rose by 11.2% from April to early September (outperforming other 
emerging markets, albeit from lower levels), falling subsequently by 15% over the rest of 
September (see Chart 2). In local currency, the Brazilian stock exchange rose notably by 
18.5% from mid-April to early September (38% from March), and Peru (15.6%) and Mexico 
(12.1%) were likewise prominent (see Chart 3). This contrasted with the slowdown in 
activity in the region, and with the change in cycle in credit ratings. In this respect, the 
expectations generated by structural reform progress in Mexico, high portfolio investment 
inflows into Peru and the expectations of a change in government in Brazil are among the 
local factors that help explain these rises, set against the earlier mentioned boom on 
financial markets globally. Two of the countries most closely linked to the commodities 
cycle, Chile and Colombia, performed significantly less favourably; this was compounded, 
in Chile, by the unveiling of a fiscal reform that heightens the tax pressure on corporations. 
The correction to Latin American stock markets in September was greater than that in 
other emerging markets since in addition to general risk aversion there have been other 
more specific factors such as uncertainty about the elections in Brazil (its stock market fell 
by almost 13% in September), the resignation of the governor of the central bank of 
SOURCES: Datastream and JP Morgan.
a Stock market indices in dollars.
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Argentina, or the fall in oil prices which has dragged down the Colombian stock market 
(-9.4%).
In the same vein, the sovereign spreads of Latin American countries have held on a 
downward path since mid-April which was interrupted briefly in August, although towards 
the end of the period examined they increased significantly (see Chart  3). The region 
performed worse than other emerging areas since this risk indicator climbed more than 
50 bp over the last six months compared with the rise of approximately 20 bp for other 
emerging markets. This behaviour was determined by the sovereign spreads of two 
countries: that of Venezuela – which rose by more than 240 bp to above 1300 bp, as the 
maturity of the highest debt of the last two years drew nearer against a backdrop of scant 
liquid international reserves and the downgrading of the sovereign rating by Standard and 
Poor’s to CCC+ – and that of Argentina, which increased from 48 bp to 740 bp, after the 
declaration of selective default (see Box 1). The other sovereign spreads decreased until 
the beginning of September, especially in Chile (-17 bp, 12%) and in Brazil (-13 bp, 6%, 
where the sovereign rating was put on negative outlook), however, they widened 
significantly in line with the other emerging countries throughout September to levels not 
reached since the beginning of the year. In Ecuador, the spread narrowed by almost 
100 bp, after its sovereign rating was moved up a notch, and subsequently widened. Also, 
interest rates on long-term bonds denominated in local currency declined in most countries 
until early September, largely correcting the tension triggered by the Federal Reserve’s 
announcement in May 2013 (see Chart 3), and rose from that date, especially in Brazil.
Similarly, credit risk premia listed in CDS declined across the region until early September 
and then increased slightly with the result that at the end of the period analysed they stood 
at the levels recorded in April. Argentina and Venezuela were the exceptions. At present, 
these premia would seemingly be more in line with the ratings given by the rating agencies 
(see Chart 3). By country, the markets have priced in upgrades of the sovereign ratings of 
Mexico and Colombia, and downgrades of between one and two notches for those of Peru 
and Chile.
Exchange rates were generally stable to September with some exceptions (see Chart 3). 
The Chilean and Argentinean peso posted the highest depreciations. In particular, the 
Chilean peso depreciated by more than 7.5% from April, against a backdrop of a fall of 
around 10% in copper prices from the beginning of the year, a reduction in interest rates 
and a non-intervention policy by the central bank. In Argentina, the official exchange rate 
of the peso depreciated sharply mid-August (by 1.3% in two days); the pressure on the 
exchange rate when markets opened was also reflected in the spread between official and 
parallel market rates which reached an all-time high. The Brazilian real, which had scarcely 
depreciated by 1.4% between April and the first week of September, fell by 10% 
subsequently, compelling the central bank to increase its degree of intervention in foreign 
exchange markets, by rolling over a higher percentage of exchange rate swaps. In 
Venezuela a third regulated exchange rate came into operation which, despite trading 88% 
lower than the official rate and 80% lower than the exchange rate in foreign exchange 
auctions, remains far removed from the parallel exchange rate.
Finally, direct investment inflows into the region moderated considerably in 2014 Q2 to 
$140 billion (in annualised terms) from $164 billion in 2013 (see Chart 4). This was mainly 
due to the lower inflows into Mexico in Q2 ($5.1 billion less than in Q1), as well as those 
into countries more closely linked to the commodities cycle such as Chile ($2.4 billion 
less). By contrast, Brazil recorded higher inflows close to the average levels observed 
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since 2011. At regional level, foreign direct investment exceeded the current account 
deficit, albeit by a very narrow margin. Conversely, portfolio inflows rose in Q2 to more 
than $84 billion in annualised terms, practically double the figure for 2013, as a result of 
investment in Mexico, particularly in the stock market which recorded the highest capital 
SOURCES: Datastream, JP Morgan, Bloomberg, Banco Central do Brasil and national statistics.
a MSCI Latin America index in local currency.
b 10-year government bonds in local currency.
c 5-year interest rate swap.
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On 30 July 2014, Argentina failed to make a coupon payment on 
the 2005 and 2010 debt restructuring bonds, amounting to 
somewhat more than $500 million. The Argentine government had 
ordered the funds to be transferred, but payment was blocked by 
a US court ruling (in the case NML Capital v Argentina).1 The court 
considered that Argentina breached the pari passu clause,2 by 
paying the creditors of the restructured debt while not paying the 
bondholders who did not participate in the 2005 and 2010 
exchange (the holdouts). The ruling requires Argentina to pay the 
holdouts the principal and coupons that have accrued to date, a 
total of $1,330 million, and blocks the funds earmarked to pay the 
restructured debt. Argentina’s sovereign rating was lowered by 
the main rating agencies to selective default level and default 
insurance was activated.
This is the second default by Argentina in the last 15 years, following 
the one in December 2001, when the government decreed a 
cessation of payments during a severe exchange rate and balance of 
payments crisis. The consequences of this default, and of the 
economic crisis that the country had been suffering since 1998, led 
to a fall in GDP of 10.9% in 2002 (and of almost 20% between 1998 
and 2002), a deposits freeze, abandonment of the convertibility 
regime and the restructuring of sovereign debt, the implications of 
which have lasted until today. However, the nature of this latest 
default is exceptional, insofar as it has not been preceded by a 
serious balance of payments deficit, sovereign debt unsustainability 
or a severe economic crisis, but rather by judicial proceedings 
unrelated to the economy’s solvency. As a result, the economic 
consequences will likely differ from those of the 2001 default. 
Moreover, this episode may have consequences for future sovereign 
restructurings, especially those relating to debt issued under New 
York law, which is usually chosen for issues made abroad.
BOX 1ARGENTINA’S DEFAULT: THE ECONOMIC AND SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING CONSEQUENCES
SOURCE: National sources.
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1  In NML Capital v Argentina, a group of creditors, who purchased 
Argentine bonds under US law following the December 2001 default on 
the secondary market and who did not participate in the 2005 and 2010 
exchanges, sued Argentina for the total amount of the principal and 
interest of the bonds in their possession. The judgment highlights the 
reluctance of Argentina to negotiate, a consequence of the “Lock Law” 
enacted in 2005, which to boost the acceptance of the exchange 
prohibits its reopening.
2  Pari passu clauses are common in debt contracts and establish that the 
debt cannot be subordinated to the debtor’s other obligations. This 
subordination can be construed as meaning equality in the ranking, to 
avoid the issuance of new debt with priority over the existing debt, or 
equality in payment, which is the way it has been interpreted in this case.
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The macroeconomic situation in Argentina today reflects significant 
weaknesses. The country entered a technical recession (two 
consecutive quarters of negative quarter-on-quarter growth) in 
2014 Q1 and posted zero year-on-year growth in 2014 Q2 (see 
Panel 1). In addition, the economy has high inflation, an overvalued 
exchange rate and is in a cyclical recession, owing to the 
exhaustion of the growth model of the last decade and, more 
immediately, the scarcity of US dollars to pay for the imports of 
goods needed by the production chain. However, the ratio of 
Argentina’s gross government debt to GDP, at 39.5%, is low by 
historical standards, while the budget deficit and, especially, the 
primary deficit are small, although on an upward trend (see Panel 
2). The main concern is that the default will accelerate the 
deterioration in the balance of payments, leading to a crisis. Thus, 
the default could aggravate the economic situation, by closing 
access to the international financial markets.
This situation would exacerbate the economic policy dilemmas 
the country has been facing over the last two years. On one hand, 
further deterioration in the balance of payments would lead to a 
major outflow of reserves, which, although slow, on account of the 
financial isolation of Argentina in the last decade and the existence 
of capital controls, is worrying. In fact, reserves have fallen to 
almost $28 billion, half their level at the beginning of 2011. The 
process of devaluation that has lowered the official exchange rate 
from 6 to 8.40 pesos to the US dollar in 2014 has not prevented a 
decline in exports, which limits foreign currency inflows, in an 
environment of falling prices for the country’s main export, soy 
beans. In the short term, the commitments acquired in the 
negotiations with the Club of Paris and Repsol and the amount of 
external debt due to mature, which is estimated as more than $11 
billion by end-2015, are exerting further pressure on the reserves 
(see Panel 3). Moreover, the devaluation could push up inflation 
(between December 2013 and August 2014 prices rose by 18.2%). 
Further restrictions could be placed on imports to preserve a 
minimum level of international reserves, but this would have an 
even more negative impact on economic growth.
On the other hand, although the agreements with Repsol and the 
Club of Paris had succeeded in reducing the level of country risk, 
the failure of negotiations with the holdouts has partly reversed 
this process (see Panel 4), causing the interest rates on debt in US 
dollars to remain high for the private sector of the economy and 
greater difficulty to attract foreign direct investment, especially to 
develop the Vaca Muerta oilfield. However, the increase in debt 
spreads has not been in line with the reaction expected before 
default,3 and appears to correspond more to a situation of illiquidity 
than to a risk of restructuring or heavy losses for creditors.
In this situation, the Argentine government has chosen to attempt 
to sidestep the blocking of funds by changing the law governing 
bonds subject to foreign law to national law. An agreement to pay 
the holdouts seems to be unlikely before January 2015, when the 
Rights Upon Future Offers (RUFO) clause, which entitles 
bondholders of the restructured debt to benefit from any better 
treatment (voluntarily) agreed with another creditor, expires. A final 
solution to the default situation may be delayed until the end of 
2015, when the mandate of President Fernández de Kirchner 
terminates.
The specific nature of the default and its potential consequences 
for the international legal framework have prompted a response 
from the international community. The IMF has warned of the 
increase in uncertainty in sovereign debt restructurings entailed by 
the Argentine episode, stemming from the improvement in the 
repayment prospects of holdout creditors and their ability to 
interrupt the flow of payments on restructured debt. During the 
hearing of the case, various countries, among them Brazil, Mexico 
and France, filed submissions in support of Argentina’s position, 
highlighting the consequences for future debt restructurings. The 
case has had an impact on the debate opened by the IMF on the 
reform of debt restructuring tools. The current focus of discussion 
is improvement of the contractual framework, to add legal 
certainty. On one hand, the collective action clauses could include 
elements of bond aggregation in the votes necessary to change 
the terms of restructured bonds. This would make the holdouts’ 
strategy more costly, as they would need to acquire a larger 
amount of bonds to achieve a majority sufficient to reject an 
agreement. On the other hand, pari passu clauses could be 
amended, to avoid the judicial interpretation that has led to the 
blocking of payments in the case of Argentina. Discussions remain 
open and, in any case, the debt currently in circulation would not 
be affected by such reforms.
BOX 1ARGENTINA’S DEFAULT: THE ECONOMIC AND SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING CONSEQUENCES (cont’d)
inflows in one quarter of the whole time series. As for Brazil, the increase in portfolio 
inflows centred on short-term fixed income securities.
From April to September 2014, fixed-income issuance in the region reached $61 billion, 
Brazil being the largest issuer both in terms of the public sector (two sovereign issues 
amounting to almost $5 billion) and the banking and oil sectors (see Chart 4). Despite the 
proximity of a change in the monetary cycle in the United States and the worsening of the 
growth outlook for the region, the conditions of these issues have not varied substantially 
3  Argentina’s EMBI rose to 5,000 bp in December 2001, following the 
announcement of default, from 1,400 bp in September.
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and there has been no significant increase in interest rates in the primary market and no 
shortening of maturities (see Chart 4).
Economic activity slowed considerably in the first half of 2014, with quarterly growth rates 
for the region averaging 0.2% in the first two quarters of the year (see Chart 5); the year-
on-year growth rate of the regional aggregate decreased from 2.3% in Q1 to 0.7% in Q2 
(see Table 1). Admittedly, the significant weight in the regional aggregate of Brazil’s 
economy – which went into recession in Q2 – accounts for most of this fall, but there was 
a very marked slowdown in Chile (1.9% year-on-year in Q2, down from 2.4% in Q1) and, 
especially, in Peru (1.7% year-on-year in Q2 and 5.1% in Q1). That comes in addition to 
the “technical” recession in Argentina in 2014 Q1, despite a slight recovery in Q2. Only 
Colombia, with growth of 6.5% year-on-year in Q1 and 4.3% in Q2, and Mexico, which 
posted stronger growth in Q2, showed greater buoyancy.
This easing of growth can be explained by both common reasons and the idiosyncratic 
situations of the countries. In Argentina and Venezuela2 the recession has specific 
characteristics to the extent that the external constraint is, to a varying degree, limiting 
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growth, against a backdrop of an overvalued exchange rate, monetisation of fiscal 
imbalances and high inflation, and the failure to adjust relative prices. In the other countries, 
also to a varying degree, the high correlation of the cycle with that of their main trading 
partners illustrates the degree of external dependence of Latin America, directly through 
demand for exports and, to a greater extent, through the effect of the terms of trade in 
aggregate demand. Accordingly, just as the continuous rise in the terms of trade supported 
economic buoyancy during the last decade, its correction in recent years has triggered, 
symmetrically, the opposite effect. That contributes to explaining the moderation of growth 
in Chile, where the cumulative fall in the terms of trade exceeded 18% in the last three 
years – although it has tended to stabilise recently – and the economy has weakened more 
than expected. In Peru, the fall in the terms of trade occurred later and more swiftly, 
accumulating 11% in the last two years, while in Colombia these terms held at a high due 
to the weight of oil in its export basket and the economy has remained very buoyant. In 
Brazil, where the terms of trade have fallen moderately, it is the collapse of investment 
which explains why the country has entered into recession after three years of below 
potential growth. Mexico, being less reliant on commodities, performed better, with a 
recovery initially led by external demand which shows different behaviour to other 
economies in the region.
By component, average domestic demand for the region contributed 2 pp to year-on-year 
growth in Q1 and 0.2 pp in Q2 (see Chart 6). External demand continued to make a very 
SOURCE: National statistics.
a Aggregate of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, as a GDP-weighted average for the region.
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SOURCE: National statistics.
a Latin America 6: all the countries represented, except Venezuela; Latin America 5: all the countries represented, except Argentina and Venezuela.
b Seasonally adjusted.
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small, albeit increasing, positive contribution (0.4 pp in Q2), since although exports grew 
only slightly, there was a considerable adjustment in imports (-1.2% in Q2).
One shared feature of the weak economic performance in the first half of the year is the 
fall in investment (-4.6% year-on-year, the first negative figure following the crisis). Two 
types of factors seem to be affecting this performance to a different extent depending 
on the country. These are, on one hand, the maturation of the investment cycle 
associated with the downward movement in commodities prices and the increase in 
production costs and, on the other, the fall in business confidence due to a loss of 
credibility to some extent in economic policy management, perception of greater 
intervention and, on occasions, the absence of a clearer reform drive to increase 
medium-term potential growth. Consequently, the decline in investment seems to be 
having a greater effect on countries that are more reliant on the commodities cycle 
(such as Chile, -8.1%, and Peru, -4.5%), or those where business confidence has 
deteriorated more (Brazil, -11%). In Mexico, where recent reforms should improve the 
climate for investors, the rate of decline of gross capital formation eased but, 
nevertheless, slipped -0.5% year-on-year in Q2 (public investment fell -8.4%). Colombia 
SOURCES: National statistics and IMF.
a Aggregate of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, as a GDP-weighted average for the region.
-15 
-10 
-5 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 ARGENTINA   BRAZIL  MEXICO 
 CHILE  LATIN AMERICA (a) 
GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 
% y-o-y 
-4 
0 
4 
8 
12 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 EXTERNAL DEMAND  GOVERNMENT CONSUMPTION 
 PRIVATE CONSUMPTION  GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION 
 STOCKBUILDING  GDP 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO YEAR-ON-YEAR GDP GROWTH (a) 
pp 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 ARGENTINA  BRAZIL 
 MEXICO  CHILE 
 LATIN AMERICA  (a) 
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION 
% y-o-y 
COMPOSITION OF GDP ON THE DEMAND SIDE 
Year-on-year rate and pp 
CHART 6
-15 
-10 
-5 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 ARGENTINA   BRAZIL  MEXICO 
 CHILE  LATIN AMERICA (a) 
EXPORTS 
% y-o-y 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 59 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, OCTOBER 2014 REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY: SECOND HALF OF 2014
continues to buck the trend with gross capital formation growth of more than 10% year-
on-year boosted by an infrastructure investment plan. Although the situation by sector 
seems very different, on average investment in machinery and equipment has contracted 
and construction growth has been weak.
In this setting of slowing domestic demand, the growth rate of private consumption has 
tended to ease to 1.3% year-on-year in Q2 (2.1% in Q1). Despite the low levels of 
unemployment in most of the countries, labour markets are weakening in several of them. 
In fact, employment has decelerated to 1% (see Chart 7), as have real salaries (even falling 
for the second consecutive year in the most vulnerable countries). Growth of credit to the 
private sector continued to moderate across all the countries, except for Colombia.
Developments in external demand notably show the emergence of marked differences 
across countries. In contrast to growth of 0.5% in volume exports for the region as a whole 
in Q2, in line with a gradual recovery in the demand of the region’s major trading partners 
and the stabilisation of China, in Mexico they grew 5.8% year-on-year in Q2. Conversely, in 
SOURCES: National statistics and Datastream.
a Aggregate of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru. 
b Aggregate of Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru.
c Aggregate of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela.
d Aggregate of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. 
e Aggregate of Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico.
f Aggregate of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
80 
85 
90 
95 
100 
105 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
 CONSUMER CONFIDENCE (a) 
 BUSINESS CONFIDENCE (b) 
CONSUMER AND BUSINESS CONFIDENCE INDICES 
2011 = 100 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
 BRAZIL  MEXICO  CHILE 
 COLOMBIA  LATIN AMERICA (c) 
REAL CHANGE IN CREDIT TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR  
% y-o-y 
EMPLOYMENT, DEMAND AND CREDIT INDICATORS 
Year-on-year rate, indices, and three-month moving average of the year-on-year rate 
CHART 7
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
 ARGENTINA  BRAZIL  MEXICO 
 CHILE  LATIN AMERICA (d) 
JOB CREATION 
% y-o-y, three-month moving average 
-4 
-2 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
2011 2012 2013 2014 
 RETAIL SALES (e) 
 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION (f) 
DEMAND AND ACTIVITY INDICATORS 
% y-o-y, three-month moving average 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 60 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, OCTOBER 2014 REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY: SECOND HALF OF 2014
Argentina, Peru, Colombia and Chile they posted large declines. The downward adjustment 
in imports is partly linked to the fall in investment.
The surplus on the trade balance narrowed substantially (excluding the data for Venezuela 
which have not been published since end-2013) and practically reached equilibrium 
against a backdrop of ongoing declines in the prices of the main commodities (see Chart 8). 
However, as a result of the reduction of the income deficit linked to lower repatriation of 
profits by commodity exporters and the positive performance of tourism, the current 
account deficit ceased widening and stabilised around an average of 2.9% for the region. 
In Chile the depreciation of the exchange rate together with the fall in investment, prompted 
a sharper correction, whereas in Colombia and Peru the external imbalance continued to 
widen.
The higher frequency indicators published after Q2 seem to anticipate greater inter-
regional differences. Industrial production recorded negative rates on average which have 
not been seen since the crisis, as a result of the performance of Brazil, Argentina, Chile 
SOURCES: Datastream, national statistics and central banks.
a Customs data in dollars, aggregate of the seven main economies except Venezuela. The trade balance of Venezuela is represented separately given that no data 
has been available since 2013 Q4. 
b Four-quarter moving average. 
c Aggregate of the seven main economies, as a GDP-weighted average for the region.
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and Peru, whereas in Colombia and Mexico it increased. In those countries for which PMIs 
are published these indices have continued on a downward trend with the exception of 
Mexico, where it has risen considerably. Finally, the growth rates of retail sales have 
remained robust (with higher growth in Mexico, Chile and Colombia and lower growth in 
Brazil) but, in any event, they are considerably lower than those recorded before 2013. 
Overall, this information points to the continued weakness in the largest countries in South 
America and, by contrast, to stronger demand in Mexico.
In contrast with the slowing trend of activity and demand, consumer prices in the group of 
five countries with inflation targets moved on a slightly rising trend (see Chart  9). The 
inflation of this set of countries, which at end-2013 stood at slightly above 4% year-on-
year, amounted to 5.2% in September 2014, mainly owing to the rise in inflation in Brazil, 
Chile and Mexico, reaching the upper limit of each central bank’s target.
The factors underlying the rise in inflation differ in these three countries which explains the 
varying monetary policy responses. In Brazil inflation hovered persistently around the 
upper limit of the band and core inflation grew at an even higher rate than headline inflation, 
as a result of the sharp increase in services prices. This has meant that medium-term 
inflation expectations have not ultimately stabilised and have exceeded the upper limit of 
the target band (see Chart 10 and Table 2). In Chile, most of the rise is attributable to the 
effect of the depreciation of the exchange rate and the medium-term inflation expectations 
which have remained anchored at around 3%, despite the increase in core inflation. In 
Mexico, although inflation rose to 4.2% year-on-year in August, the central bank of Mexico 
has forcefully eased monetary policy as it considers that the rise is temporary. Medium-
term expectations have tended to decrease, demonstrating Mexico’s highly credible 
monetary policy. In Peru and Colombia inflation held at rates within the target bands, in the 
case of Colombia despite the buoyancy of domestic demand.
The Brazilian central bank ended the cycle of monetary tightening in April, following a 
cumulative rise of 375 bp in one year, and has held official interest rates at 11% since then. 
Tougher internal financial conditions, together with the gradual opening up of the output 
gap on account of slowing demand, should make it easier to steer medium-term inflation 
towards its target. However, the possibility of adjustments to administered prices following 
the elections and the recent deprecation of the real are upside risks which could make 
meeting the target difficult. The central bank has recently relaxed the reserve requirement 
to increase liquidity.
The central bank of Mexico lowered its official interest rate by 50 bp to 3% in June, in an 
unanticipated move (the cumulative cut over the last two years amounted to 150 bp), while 
the Chilean central bank cut its benchmark rate at each of its last three meetings by 25 bp 
to 3.25%. Finally, the central bank of Peru, which had taken action specifically by 
decreasing the reserve requirement in recent months, also decreased its official interest 
rate in September to 3.50%, down from 3.75% in July. Colombia was the only country to 
raise official interest rates (by 125 bp) against a backdrop of strong domestic demand, 
although the recent slowdown in output to around the potential growth rate may indicate 
the end of the upward cycle.
In Argentina, inflation, according to the new official index, stood at 19.8% in cumulative 
terms to September, a growth rate which once again seems to diverge from private 
estimates (ranging from 35% to 40% year-on-year). Monetary policy, which had tended to 
tighten in tandem with the exchange rate adjustment at the beginning of the year, eased 
Prices and economic 
policies
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over the summer with an interest rate cut against a backdrop of a worsening recession and 
the selective default, although this easing was subsequently reversed. Finally, in Venezuela, 
where the money supply is increasing at rates of above 100% to finance the government 
deficit, inflation soared to 59.7% year-on-year in August, a situation which is getting worse 
due to the shortage of consumer and producer goods arising from the fall in imports 
because of the tight restrictions on access to foreign currency.
Fiscal policy has remained, on average, neutral or slightly expansionary according to the 
changes in the cyclically-adjusted primary fiscal balance, albeit with considerable 
differences across countries. Venezuela continues to pose the greatest risks in this 
connection, where, with the due caution warranted by the shortage of data, it is estimated 
that the already burgeoning deficit has continued to increase (actual primary expenditure 
according to the Treasury increased 18% in real terms in the first five months of the year, 
after having fallen 5% in 2013). Argentina is also fragile from a fiscal standpoint (see Box 1). 
In the other countries, there has been a tendency to postpone the expected fiscal 
consolidation, especially on account of the cyclical fall in revenue which has also been 
impacted by the decline in commodities prices. Additionally, certain stimuli have been 
extended (Brazil), expansionary fiscal packages have been announced (Chile) and the 
consolidation targets envisaged have been postponed (Mexico). On the whole, revenue 
SOURCES: Datastream and national statistics.
a Aggregate of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, as a GDP-weighted average for the region.
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SOURCES: National statistics and Fiscal Monitor (IMF).
a Aggregate of the seven main economies, as a GDP-weighted average of the region.
b In Venezuela, 2012 quarterly data estimated from annual data. In 2013 and 2014 aggregate excluding Venezuela.
c Excludes untendered debt in the debt swap offers of 2005 and 2010.
d Aggregate of the six countries represented.
e Aggregate excluding Argentina and Venezuela.
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has tended to moderate whereas expenditure continued to rise. The aggregate budget 
deficit has grown to close to 3% of the region’s GDP and the aggregate primary surplus 
has disappeared (see Chart 10).
At the Pacific Alliance summit in July it was announced that from Q4 the Mexican Stock 
Exchange will be included in the Latin American Integrated Market (“MILA” by its Spanish 
abbreviation) which currently comprises the stock exchanges of Colombia, Chile and Peru. 
This will create a stock market with a capitalisation of more than $1.2 billion (representing 
58% of the four countries’ GDP) and around 1,000 firms. The possibility of closer ties with 
MERCOSUR was discussed, with a view to all or some of its members joining this bloc – a 
change which could be of some importance for the Alliance in the future – and certain free 
trade agreements were concluded which will give Panama and Costa Rica access to the 
bloc. The Alliance’s focus on the Pacific was reflected by its members commencing and 
making progress with negotiations to reach free trade agreements with Asian countries 
(Peru with India and Russia, Chile with Indonesia and Colombia with Japan).
Relations between MERCOSUR members continue to encounter difficulties. As a result of 
the financial problems in Argentina and weaker activity, intra-bloc trade has decreased 
considerably: Brazil’s exports to other members fell 11% year-on-year in the first seven 
months of the year, while Argentina’s exports declined at rates of 12%. Consequently, 
Brazil’s exports to the rest of the bloc have decreased from 14% of its total exports in 2009 
to less than 10% at present, whereas the share of imports has slipped from 11% to 7.5%. 
Admittedly, closer ties with the Pacific Alliance were not discussed at the summit at end-
July, but the intention was announced to include Bolivia as a full member and to set up a 
trade area with the member countries of ALBA (Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas) and 
Petrocaribe (two regional agreements promoted by Venezuela). The elections in Brazil and 
Uruguay could prompt changes in the relations with other members and in the negotiations 
with other trade blocs if there are changes in the current governments. At the same time, 
the offer by MERCOSUR to resume negotiation of the treaty with the European Union, 
which would cover 90% of trade, has been completed, while Brazil and Argentina extended 
their car trade agreement for another year, with slightly more favourable conditions for 
Argentina.
In the area of structural reforms, in Mexico the necessary legislation for the entry into force 
of the reforms approved in the previous six months was enacted, especially the energy 
reform which has turned out to be more ambitious than initially planned. For this programme 
of reforms to raise Mexico’s potential growth rate, its effective implementation is essential 
(see Box  2). In Chile a fiscal reform was approved to raise tax collection to finance 
improvements in the education and health systems. Finally, several initiatives and laws 
were approved in Venezuela which further increase government intervention.
Brazil’s economy entered a technical recession in 2014 Q2 since the quarter-on-quarter 
rate of change in GDP fell by -0.6%, after declining -0.2% in the previous quarter 
(revised down from 0.2%), as a result of the widespread slowdown in domestic demand 
and, in particular, in investment which decreased by -5.3%. In year-on-year terms GDP 
contracted by -0.9% in Q2, following an increase of 1.9% in Q1 and three years of weak 
growth of around 2%. The rate of investment fell back to 16.5% of GDP, the lowest 
since 2006, and the higher frequency indicators point to continued weakness in the 
short term (see Chart 11). Private consumption, which had been the main support for 
growth in recent years, also eased significantly to a year-on-year rate of 1.2% in Q2. 
Factors explaining these developments include the inflation performance, a slight 
Trade and reforms
Economic developments 
by country
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After almost two decades without any progress in structural 
reforms, the Government elected following the July 2012 elections 
proposed an agenda of sweeping reforms – unprecedented since 
the late 1980s – aimed at boosting the country’s potential growth. 
Indeed, Mexico, which has sound fundamentals – macroprudential 
policy management, low external vulnerability, above-investment-
grade credit ratings and a healthy financial system – nevertheless 
evidences low factor productivity and very low growth rates, down 
on those of previous decades (see Panel  1). This box briefly 
examines the main reforms approved in Mexico.
The most significant reform from the economic standpoint 
concerns the energy sector, which affects both the oil and the 
electricity generation and distribution industries. This reform – 
which required an amendment to the Constitution – seeks to raise 
the country’s crude oil output, which stood in mid-2014 at its 
lowest level since 1980 (see Panel 2), by improving the management 
and efficiency of PEMEX, and to reduce the high cost of electricity 
in Mexico (it is about 70% higher than in the United States).
The part of the reform referring to hydrocarbons opens the way 
for agreements with private corporations on exploration and 
extraction, as well as for granting refining, petrochemical, 
transport and storage permits, although the nation will retain 
exclusivity over the ownership of sub-soil resources. The 
secondary legislation needed to set the reform in train was 
approved in mid-August. It establishes the so-called round zero 
– assignments by exploration area and production field that will 
be retained exclusively by PEMEX, and which will allow joint 
ventures –, it strengthens the budgetary autonomy of PEMEX – as 
the Treasury partly absorbs the company’s pension system and 
its equivalent in the electricity industry, the CFE (Federal 
Electricity Board)1 –, and it liberalises retail distribution, opening 
the petrol station sector up to private companies in 2016, and 
eliminating in full fuel subsidies, which have been equivalent to 
1% of GDP on average over the past five years, in 2018. Finally, 
private capital inflows into the oil sector, the Government 
proposes up to three exploitation models: payment of exploration 
fees, payment of royalties and wealth distribution arrangements. 
This flexibility in the format of agreements is the centrepiece of 
the new legislation, as it will enable each type of exploitation 
arrangement to be tailored to the most appropriate and profitable 
model both for PEMEX and for the private sector. Moreover, that 
part of the reform relating to the electricity sector introduces 
competition into the generation segment, allowing the participation 
BOX 2PROGRESS IN MEXICAN STRUCTURAL REFORMS
SOURCES: INEGI and Banco de España.
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of private firms and opening the way for industrial clients to 
choose their suppliers. Moreover, the creation of a wholesale 
electricity market is planned, under the control of the new National 
Centre for Energy Control, where the large corporations may sell 
the electricity they generate. The CFE will also maintain the 
distribution and sale of electricity to households. In both sectors 
– hydrocarbons and electricity – the powers of the regulatory 
agencies will be strengthened. 
Another very significant reform, approved in June 2013 and 
implemented in July 2014, is that of the telecommunications 
sector. The aim is to reduce the cost of access to these services, 
which is twice that in the United States, and to raise the number of 
users. The new law eliminates the restrictions on foreign investment 
in mobile telephony, requires firms with a dominant position in the 
market to divest themselves of assets, and creates a new 
regulating body, the Instituto Federal de Comunicaciones, to 
oversee licence awards.2
The reform of the financial sector, approved in January 2014, 
seeks to introduce greater competition and efficiency, facilitating 
the transfer of collateral and salary payments from one institution 
to another, simplifying the regime for providing and realising 
collateral, cutting the commissions charged to businesses for the 
use of electronic means of payment and strengthening the agency 
responsible for processing user complaints. It should be recalled 
here that Mexico is not a highly banked economy. Bank lending in 
Mexico represents around 30% of GDP (20 pp below the average 
level in the region and far below the level corresponding to its per-
capita income) and barely 20% of the population use formal 
financial services. In short, the financial reform aims to increase 
the protection of creditors’ property rights, eliminating the legal 
loopholes that allow debtors to draw out the debt resolution 
process. On the regulation front, the Basel III rules have been 
afforded the status of a law and savers’ rights in bank insolvencies, 
a key aspect of the protracted 1995 crisis, are clarified. The 
reform contains some points that would indicate greater public 
involvement in the sector, such as the strengthening of 
development banking (removing from its mandate the need to 
maintain a high level of capitalisation and boosting the financing 
of underbanked sectors) and the power of authorities to carry out 
periodic assessments of credit levels, to encourage greater 
supply.
The fiscal reform, approved in October 2013, seeks to increase tax 
revenues by 2% of GDP in 2018 and to expand the social security 
network, establishing unemployment insurance, raising income 
tax and indirect taxes, reducing certain corporate income tax 
exemptions and harmonising VAT across sectors. The new law 
also adopts a structural fiscal rule, which limits the pro-cyclicality 
of fiscal policy, and sets up a sovereign wealth fund that will 
finance part of education and social security spending. Finally, the 
labour reform, approved under the previous government, seeks to 
reduce labour market entry and exit costs in order to limit 
informality.
The approved package of reforms (mostly second generation ones, 
which not only eliminate obstacles to growth, but also actively 
promote it) will impact potential growth through numerous channels, 
in addition to the effect, common to all reforms, on agents’ 
confidence. Without claiming to be exhaustive, the energy reform 
would act, among other factors, on foreign direct investment, 
attracting more capital to the oil industry. The fiscal reform would 
increase fiscal room for manoeuvre, reducing the pro-cyclicality of 
fiscal policy by establishing a new fiscal rule. The telecommunications 
and electricity industry reforms would liberalise services and increase 
competition further, reducing the pressure on consumer prices and 
thereby increasing monetary policy’s room for manoeuvre. The 
labour reform would tend to increase productivity by reducing the 
degree of informality in the economy through the extension of social 
security benefits and the creation of unemployment insurance. 
Finally, the financial reform would make it easier for a larger part of 
the population to access banking services. 
Estimates suggest that the energy reform could attract an extra 
$5-30 billion of investment to the oil industry each year (the higher 
figure is the Government’s forecast). Under the official scenario, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows would amount to 1.5% of 
Mexican GDP, double their current levels, which have been very 
low since 2003 (see Panel 3), this being one of the factors 
explaining the low level of productivity in the Mexican economy. 
As seen for a broad panel of emerging countries in Panel 4, the 
correlation between FDI inflows and growth is positive; on the 
basis of this direct effect alone, Mexico could raise its long-term 
growth. Nevertheless, the entry into force of this broad set of 
structural reforms over a relatively short time period makes it 
difficult to estimate its overall impact. The range of estimates for 
the impact of the reform package on the potential growth rate is 
wide, extending from 0.5 to 2 pp. At the lower end, this would raise 
potential growth to 3.5%, and at the upper end to 5%. Reforms 
usually take a long time to bear fruit, but even the lower end of this 
range of estimates represents a very significant increase above 
Mexico’s trend rate of growth over the last 30 years.
BOX 2PROGRESS IN MEXICAN STRUCTURAL REFORMS (cont’d)
2  The main changes are: 1) elimination of preferential tariffs (whereby calls 
to phones using the same provider are cheaper); 2) elimination of 
domestic long-distance charges; 3) elimination of roaming charges, and 
4) the requirement that companies supply unlocked mobile phones and 
allow customers to change provider in under 24 hours.
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downturn in the labour market, particularly in industry, wage moderation and lower 
growth of consumer credit. In particular, free-market lending decelerated to year-on-
year rates of 5% in a climate of high household debt, although the rates for directed 
credit remained very high (27.3%).
The volume of exports grew moderately in Q2, by 1.9% year-on-year, as a result of the 
recovery in demand in the United States, Europe and Asia, excluding China. The 
contribution of the external sector to growth was positive chiefly due to the decrease in 
imports, of 2.4% year-on-year, which were pulled down by capital goods imports. In this 
setting and despite the slight deterioration in the terms of trade, the current account deficit 
decreased very gradually over the six months to 3.6% of GDP in August, thanks to a small 
improvement in the surplus on the trade balance which increased from 0.1% of GDP in 
January to 0.3% in August, which offset a fresh deterioration in the services balance from 
-2.1% of GDP to -2.2%.
The high frequency indicators do not indicate a favourable outlook in the short term: 
industry and construction confidence indexes stand below 50 or close to lows, as does the 
consumer confidence indicator. By contrast, industrial production in July recovered 
slightly, led by capital goods, a trend that was endorsed by the positive data of the monthly 
GDP indicator for July.
Despite weak domestic demand, inflation climbed from 5.6% in January to 6.5% in August, 
just on the limit of the target band on account of the strong rise in services prices. Core 
inflation rose from 6% in January to 6.7% in September. Against this backdrop, the central 
bank of Brazil has held its interest rate at 11% since April, following a cumulative increase 
of 375 bp. In the fiscal realm, the primary surplus fell to 1.3% of GDP in July, making it 
difficult to comply with the target of 1.9% for 2014, although it was announced recently 
that part of the funds from the sovereign wealth fund will be used to achieve the 
aforementioned primary surplus. The government deficit stood at 3.96%, its highest level 
since 2009, in a setting in which the slowdown in revenue growth (4.8% to July compared 
with 11.2% in 2013) outpaced that of expenditure (12.2% compared with 14.1% in the 
previous year). Nevertheless, it was attempted to maintain some fiscal impulse by 
extending industry exemptions and social contributions and action by BNDES to boost 
activity. Moody’s changed the outlook on the sovereign credit rating to negative. The 
current president, Dilma Roussef, won the first round of the presidential elections; a victory 
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in the second round at the end of the month would point to a scenario of continuity in 
economic policies.
Following a lacklustre first quarter in which GDP grew 0.4% quarter-on-quarter, Mexico’s 
economy experienced a more visible recovery from the second quarter (1% quarter-on-
quarter) which, according to the most recent indicators, seems to be continuing in the 
second half of the year. The year-on-year rate of change of GDP in Q2 stood at 1.6%, 
compared with 1.9% in Q1, although it was pushed downwards by the effect of Easter (net 
of that effect year-on-year growth is estimated to have been 2.7%). The economic recovery 
is mainly led by the external sector (see Chart 11). Goods exports continued to perform 
well, increasing by 7.7% year-on-year in Q2 following a rise of 6.9% in Q1. Conversely, the 
fall in activity in the United States early in the year, a higher-than-expected impact on 
private consumption and investment from the rise in taxes, the slow recovery of construction 
and the drop in oil production had a negative effect on domestic demand. The high 
frequency indicators for Q3 (IMEF [Mexican Institute of Financial Executives] and producer 
confidence) suggest a strengthening of the cycle in the second half of the year, boosted by 
external demand and public spending, particularly on infrastructure. Also, it is estimated 
that other domestic demand components will begin to lend greater support. Thus, the 
unemployment rate decreased to 5.2% of the labour force in August (5.5% in July), 
employment in the formal sector increased by 3.2% in Q2, more than in previous quarters, 
and informal employment fell. Wages have been growing by 4% in real terms.
Inflation rose again towards rates of 4.2% year-on-year in September, slightly above the 
upper limit of the target band, although this was as a result of base effects which should 
peter out and permit rates to return to around 3% year-on-year from next year. Medium-
term inflation expectations have not moved significantly from 3.5%. In this setting, the 
central bank cut the monetary policy rate by 50 bp in June to 3%. This decision was not 
unanimous for the first time in a long while. According to the minutes, the argument 
prevailed that inflation remains under control and no inflationary pressure was detected in 
the monetary policy horizon, along with the strategy of “efficient convergence” which 
means leading inflation towards the target with the lowest possible cost in terms of activity. 
At the beginning of August, the central bank chose to leave rates unchanged in a decision 
which shows confidence in the strength of the economy. The government deficit widened 
to 3.22% of GDP in Q2 and the primary balance deteriorated (-1.29% compared with 
-0.89% in Q1).
After 2014 Q1 when Argentina slipped into a technical recession, posting quarter-on-
quarter growth of -0.5% (following -0.5% in 2013 Q4), in Q2 its economy grew 0.9%. The 
year-on-year growth rate stood at zero, down from 0.3% in Q1 (revised upwards). These 
developments are explained by the fall in domestic demand weighed down by the 
contraction of private consumption (-2.5% year-on-year) and gross capital formation 
(-3.7% year-on-year), which were only partially offset by government consumption (4% 
year-on-year). External demand made a positive contribution due to the significant decline 
of imports which was above 10% year-on-year. The economic situation is expected to 
worsen in the second half of the year. Exports and imports continued to fall at sustained 
rates of 10% year-on-year between January and August, as a result of the decline in soy 
bean prices and the restrictions arising from the shortage of foreign currency, and the 
12-month cumulated deficit of the current account widened in Q2 to $6.2 billion, slightly 
more than 1% of GDP, while the capital and financial accounts also ran a slight deficit due 
to the loan repayments by the central bank to international organisations. Reserves stood 
at levels of less than $29 billion which prompted a devaluation of the peso early in the year 
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(see Chart 12). The judgment of the New York court in the trial against the holdouts, which 
blocked payment of the restructured debt, has led the country to a situation of selective default 
since 30 July, with implications for its economic performance (see Box 1).
Inflation continued to rise and stood at 19.8% in cumulative terms to September, against 
a backdrop characterised by the ongoing monetisation of the government deficit and an 
increase in the pace of devaluation of the official exchange rate (8.44 pesos per dollar, 
compared with 8.1 in July). The gap between the official and unofficial exchange rate 
against the dollar widened to a high of more than 70%. In an attempt to ease exchange 
rate pressure, the central bank once again reduced the limit on dollar holdings of the 
banking system (to 20% of their asset position). The monetary base grew to August by 
slightly more than 19%, down from 24% at the end of last year and the lowest rate since 
2010. This decline was explained by the absorption of liquidity by the central bank’s 
auctions of securities, which was prompted by the rise in interest rates of almost 1000 bp 
since the beginning of the year. On the fiscal front, the public-sector primary deficit in the 
last 12 months stood at 0.7% of GDP, taking into account the central bank’s transfers. 
Although public-sector revenue grew in nominal terms by around 39% year-on-year in the 
12 months to July, as a result of high inflation, primary expenditure grew by 41%, due to 
the rise in current transfers to the private sector (subsidies).
During the first half of 2014, Chile’s economy slowed more than expected. In quarter-on-
quarter terms, GDP expanded 0.6% in Q1 and 0.2% in Q2, and in year-on-year terms it 
grew by 2.4% and 1.9% respectively, easing very significantly compared with average 
growth of 5% in the last three years. Domestic demand posted declines in two consecutive 
quarters and the year-on-year pace of contraction of investment stepped up to -8.1%. For 
a small open economy like Chile’s, real effects of the commodities cycle have repercussions 
far beyond the realm of external and fiscal accounts. Consequently, in tandem with the 
decrease in copper prices and the depreciation of the exchange rate (by more than 13% 
against the dollar in the year to date) the composition of growth is rebalancing sharply and 
relatively quickly. This adjustment has led domestic demand to shave practically 2 pp off 
growth in Q2 and external demand to contribute 3.8 pp, as a result of the fall in investment 
and imports and of the, as yet, slow response of exports (-0.4% in Q2) (see Chart 12). 
Private consumption weakened considerably (1.9% year-on-year in Q2 compared with 
5.2% in 2013) and only public consumption was more buoyant. In this setting, the 
unemployment rate followed a slightly upward trend.
SOURCES: Banco Central de la República Argentina and Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas of Chile. 
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The trade surplus to August was higher than that recorded during the same period a year 
earlier due to the strong fall in the value of imports (-9.1% year-on-year), since exports also 
decreased (-0.4% year-on-year). These developments, together with the lower repatriation 
of profits by commodity exporters, have been giving rise to a correction in the current 
account deficit which, at -2.4% in Q2, was more than 1.5 pp lower than a year earlier. 
Inflation climbed to 4.9% in September, above the upper limit of the central bank’s target, 
reflecting the pass-through effect of the exchange rate. However, medium-term inflation 
expectations remain anchored at around 3%. Against this background, the central bank 
cut official interest rates by a further 75 bp from April to 3.25% in September. On the fiscal 
front, central government revenue decreased by -0.2% in the first half of the year with 
respect to the same period of the previous year, while expenditure increased 5.3%. In the 
first half of the year, a surplus of 0.1% of GDP was recorded, although for the year as a 
whole a deficit of around 2% of GDP is expected due to the foreseeable quickening of 
expenditure during the second half of the year; the structural deficit will stand slightly 
above 1% of GDP. The government presented a fiscal stimulus package amounting to 
$500 million geared at stimulating public and private investment. Lastly, the fiscal reform 
was approved mid-September by the Chilean parliament with the aim of increasing tax 
collection by 3% of GDP to 2018. The funds obtained will be used for the education 
reform, health spending and greater fiscal balance.
Peru’s economy also slowed more than expected during the first half of 2014. GDP posted 
zero quarter-on-quarter growth in Q2, following the quarter-on-quarter contraction of 
-0.2% in Q1. In year-on-year terms, the economy decelerated to 1.7% in Q2 from 5.1% in 
Q1. This performance is due both to the behaviour of domestic demand – which eased to 
2.2% year-on-year in Q2 despite relatively firm private consumption owing to the sharp fall 
in investment (4% year-on-year) – and of external demand which shaved 0.7 pp off growth 
due to the decline in exports. The unemployment rate remained stable at below 6%. In the 
first half of the year the trade deficit widened; the pace of contraction of exports accelerated 
significantly mainly as a result of lower demand for commodities (see Chart  13). The 
current account deficit continued to widen to 5.1% of GDP. Inflation tended to moderate 
gradually to 2.7% year-on-year in September, within the central bank’s target interval (2% 
+/- 1 pp). The central bank of Peru cut its benchmark interest rate in July and September 
by 25 bp to 3.5%. Similarly, in order to increase the funding of lending in local currency, it 
reduced the marginal reserve requirement for sol-denominated deposits six times (which 
SOURCE: Cavenez and Datastream.
a Four-quarter moving average.
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left it at 10.5%) and relaxed the reserve requirement for foreign trade. On the fiscal front, 
the central government recorded a primary surplus equivalent to 1% of GDP in the 
January-August period, which was lower than that of 1.8% posted in the same period of 
2013.
In Colombia, activity began to slow in 2014 Q2 (-0.1% quarter-on-quarter and 4.3% year-
on-year) following a very dynamic first quarter (2.5% quarter-on-quarter and 6.7% year-
on-year). Nevertheless, it is the most buoyant country in the region. Growth in Q2 was 
supported by domestic demand which expanded 7.7% year-on-year, largely driven by 
investment (11% year-on-year) particularly in civil engineering works. By contrast, external 
demand explained the slowdown to a large degree, since it trimmed 4.4 pp from growth as 
a result of a sharp contraction of exports (8.6% year-on-year), due to base effects and 
supply constraints in the oil sector. The current account deficit continued to widen in the 
first half of the year and amounted to 4.4% of GDP in Q2. The leading indicators for Q3 
show a slight easing, in a setting of a positive performance of the labour and credit markets. 
Inflation held within the central bank’s target range (2%-4%), although it moved on a rising 
path reaching 2.9% in September in year-on-year terms as a result of higher food and 
house prices. Core inflation remained at below 3% almost throughout that period, favoured 
by the appreciation of the exchange rate. The central bank increased official interest rates 
by 25 bp at each of its last five meetings to August (when they stood at 4.5%) but left them 
unchanged at the meeting in September given the moderation of domestic activity and 
uncertainty in the international arena. Turning to fiscal matters, noteworthy is the 
government’s proposal for a new fiscal reform in order to boost tax revenue and to enable 
it to meet the central government deficit target for 2014 and 2015 of 2.4% of GDP. In July 
Moody’s raised Colombia’s rating from Baa3 to Baa2 with a stable outlook, bringing it into 
line with S&P’s and Fitch’s ratings.
Venezuela’s GDP data for the first half of 2014 and most of the high frequency indicators 
since September 2013 have still not been published. Partial indicators of the economy’s 
position in the cycle such as output and car sales decreased very sharply in the first seven 
months of the year (see Chart 13), steel production fell by around -25%, and the use of oil 
rigs was down by -2%. By contrast, two of the variables underpinning private consumption 
– employment and credit – performed more favourably. Job creation stood at 3.1% year-
on-year in the period of January-July 2014 and credit-card credit grew at rates of above 
20% in real terms, although real wages continued to fall at very high rates. Inflation was 
59.7% in August, owing to the shortage of imported goods (imports fell 20% in dollar 
terms in the first four months of 2014), growth of the money supply of more than 100% and 
the devaluation of the exchange rate prompted in practice by the entry into operation of 
SICAD II, the new foreign exchange market.
Reserves stood at $21 billion at end-August (down by approximately $8 billion on January 
2013), $6.5 billion of which are estimated to be liquid. The government has proposed the 
sale of PDVSA’s subsidiary in the United States (Citgo) and has signed several loans with 
foreign oil companies in exchange for licences in the Orinoco belt, in order to preserve a 
minimum level of reserves, given the ongoing decline in exports (2% in the first four months 
of 2014). However, a large foreign debt will mature soon which has prompted a sharp 
increase in Venezuela’s sovereign spread and a downgrading of its country rating to CCC+. 
At the end of September the government announced that part of PDVSA’s revenue may be 
sold in SICAD II, thus easing budget restrictions, both of the government and of the state 
oil company in domestic currency, in addition to boosting the supply of foreign currency in 
that market which can be accessed by the private sector.

